In the 21st Century, a paradox has emerged in the way Americans relate to Israel and the ArabIsraeli conflict. On the one hand, sympathy for Israel is widespread and deeply rooted in American political culture. Moreover, in the new millennium it has surged to unprecedented heights. On the other hand, there are increasing divisions among Americans over the Arab-Israeli conflict and these divisions increasingly line up with the main cultural, political, ideological, and religious divides. What is more, these divisions are mutually reinforcing, as evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews are likely to hold conservative political views and support the Republicans, while mainline Christians and non-Orthodox Jews are likely to hold liberal views and support the Democrats. This paper will survey, analyse and explain this paradox by examining both elite discourse and public opinion. It argues that the political impact of this paradox is twofold. Because the cultural foundations of American sympathy for Israel are very resilient, the underlying commitment to Israeli security remains consensual and robust; increased immigration of Hispanics is very unlikely to reverse this. However, the growth of liberalism among younger generations means that support for Israeli policy to the peace process will become increasingly conditional among Democrats.
Introduction
The United States has a special relationship with Israel; a defining feature of which is that support for Israel goes beyond an empirical calculation of U.S. interests. This is because the special relationship is grounded on deep cultural foundations that predate not only the creation of pro-Israel lobbying organizations but also the mass immigration of Jews to America. What we have here is an 'Israel paradox' in American political culture. On the one hand, sympathy for Israel is deep-seated, widespread and increasingly robust. On other hand, there are increasing divisions among Americans over the Arab-Israeli conflict and these divisions increasingly line up with the main political, ideological, and religious divides. What is more, these divisions are mutually reinforcing, as evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews are likely to hold conservative political views and support the Republicans, while non-religious Americans, non-Orthodox Jews are likely to hold liberal views and support the Democrats. This paper explores this paradox and analyses its political consequences.
Why political culture?
The US-Israeli relationship is much discussed and much analysed. The approach adopted here focuses on the importance of political culture. The contention is not that political culture explains everything about the relationship but rather that it explains several important factors, that the other two main approaches -Realism and domestic politics --cannot do independent of the cultural variable.
The Realist approach to international relations views shifts in the balance of power between states and the national interest defined in terms of power and state security as the key to understanding international relations. 3 From this perspective U.S. support for Israel is viewed as stemming primarily from the perception of Israel as a strategic asset for the United States. 4 Indeed, international politics and U.S. interests have clearly played a significant role in influencing U.S. policy to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it is not always clear whether supporting Israel has been in the U.S. interest or not. In fact, there has been a long standing debate among American policy makers as to whether Israel is a strategic asset or a liability. This debate has intensified in the twenty-first century. Crucially, it is not simply a debate over the nature of the empirical reality that can be settled by "facts" alone; rather it is a debate informed by different subjective conceptions of what American grand strategy ought to be. As a result, even Realists, such as Walter Lippmann and George Kennan, thought that cultural factors can profoundly affect grand strategy. 5 Thus, in order to explain the influence of strategic factors on U.S. policy, one must first understand the place of Israel in these ideational constructs, which are an integral part of America's political culture. 
Ideology and Partisanship
The most important cleavage in US politics is that between Republicans and conservatives on the one hand, and Democrats and liberals on the other. There is a long-term trend towards ideological polarization along party lines. 32 For many years, this trend did not significantly affect attitudes towards Israel. This is no longer the case. Since the collapse of the Oslo process and 9/11 a sympathy gap has opened up. Before then, Republicans and conservatives were only slightly more sympathetic to Israel over the Palestinians than liberals and Democrats, since then the gap has more than doubled. This is because while the level of sympathy for Israel among Democrats has remained stable, support for Israel has surged among Republicans. Yet, it is not just that a larger proportion of Republicans and conservatives are more sympathetic to Israel, but also that a higher proportion of Democrats and liberals prefer the Palestinians over Israel (Table 1) . 
In addition, a policy divide has also developed. A majority of Republicans and conservatives believe that the US should take Israel's side in the conflict ( 
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Religion counts in American politics and Protestantism plays a particularly important role in
American political culture in general, and with regard to Israel in particular. The central dividing line among American Protestants is between the mainline church and evangelicals. This divide has also become increasingly important on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Evangelicals provide the largest base of support for Israel and they have become mobilized to this affect. In contrast, the strongest base of anti-Israel activism in American society is in the mainline church, which has been at the forefront of the divestment campaign. Consequently, it is important to examine this divide in depth. Consequently, the theological and political divide between evangelical pro-Israel activists and mainline pro-Palestinian activists could not be much wider.
Yet, the difference between the mainline and evangelical publics is far narrower. A plurality of the mainline public actually sympathizes with Israel over the Palestinians. 75 So while there is an opinion gap between the evangelical and the mainline publics over Israel, there is actually an opinion divide within the mainline over Israel -between their political activists and the mainline public. Indeed, the percentage of mainliners who think the US should side with Israel increased significantly in the first decade of the new millennium 76 , ironically at the very time when the mainline church adopted the diametrically opposed position in strident terms (table 10) . 'There exists a distance and detachment between young American Jews and their Israeli cousins that…has not existed in the American Jewish community until now". 78 Israel in the Age of Eminem, 2003 Attachment to Israel While a large majority of American Jews remain attached to Israel, there is a significant attachment gap between different over-lapping sub-groups. The Orthodox, the affiliated, the inmarried, and older Jews are all more attached to Israel than the non-Orthodox, the inter-married, the unaffiliated and younger Jews respectively. The key factor here is that the first group retains a stronger sense of Jewish peoplehood than the latter group. To some extent, this attachment gap Yet there is also a major difference between opinion trends among Americans Jews and American non-Jews regarding Israel. For while the American public's sympathy for Israel has increased since 9/11, the debate regarding American Jewish attachment, has been as to whether it is stable or whether American Jews are distancing from Israel. There does appear to be a trend whereby young non-Orthodox Jews are less attached to Israel than their forbearers. 80 Given "AIPAC doesn't speak for the entire Jewish community." 83 Joseph Biden, September 2008 In the past, pro-Israel lobbying was based on the norm of 'consensual solidarity' -which meant operating on the basis of a communal consensus that revolved around supporting the elected government of Israel. However, a divide has opened up over the peace process. In place of 'consensual solidarity' a new norm of 'pluralistic solidarity' is emerging within the organized community, according to which various sub-groups adopt their own public political stance on the peace process on the basis of their ideology, rather than following a communal consensus or following Israeli government policy. The clearest expression of this is the emergence of the 'pro-Israel pro-peace' J Street lobby as an alternative to the mainstream lobby -AIPAC. However, this shift is not confined to the Left. Right-wing Jewish organizations have also broken with the norm of consensual solidarity. To a certain extent this process has been influenced by developments in the Israeli debate, which became increasingly polarized in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon war and especially after the first intifada, as well as by greater trans-national ties and easier access to the Israeli media. 84 But it is also shaped by the same ideological, theological and partisan divisions that divide opinion to the conflict among the general public in America. Thus, whereas the organized community has become more polarized over the conflict, notably over settlements (table 12 ) such divisions as exist among the American Jewish public over the peace process have largely been nullified by the widespread belief that the Palestinians do not really want peace and that they are primarily responsible for the failure to achieve that objective (table 13) . 85 In this, American Jewish opinion parallels mainstream public opinion in the U.S., as well as Israeli public opinion since 2001. Regarding the political consequences of the shift to 'pluralistic solidarity' for pro-Israel lobbying, while pluralism may serve to keep more American Jews engaged with Israel, it also weakens the power of the mainstream pro-Israel lobby by eroding its ability to define what it means to be "pro-Israel" in the American political arena.
Conclusion
Each of the groups discussed above has its own nuances, yet an over-arching pattern is clear. First, in each case the underlying orientation is sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians. Second, the gaps and divides within each group are mutually reinforcing. Evangelical Christians and Orthodox
Jews are likely to hold conservative political views, prefer a hawkish strategy and support the Republicans. All of these groups are also more likely to believe that the U.S. should side with Israel and that the Palestinians are mainly to blame for the failure to achieve peace, while being equivocal about the creation of a Palestinian state and the construction of settlements. In contrast, nonOrthodox Jews and many mainline Christians are likely to hold liberal political views, prefer a dovish grand strategy and support the Democrats. All of these groups tend to support the creation of a Palestinian state and oppose settlements, as well as active American mediation to achieve these ends. The Left is more internally divided on Israel and the conflict than the Right, but the basic division holds.
This coalescence into a single divide is symptomatic of the fact that Americans have become increasingly ideologically polarized; a situation that increasingly finds expression in party politics as the Republican base has become more conservative and the Democratic base more liberal. Indeed, the values gap between Republicans and Democrats has become greater than the gender, age, race or class divide between the parties. 88 The fact that this values divide between the parties has grown across the numerous issues, especially foreign policy 89 , strongly suggests that the growing divide over policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is part of this general process of partisan-ideological polarization in American politics.
What then are the political consequences of the Israel paradox: increased sympathy for Israel combined with increased division over how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict?
On the one hand, various factors point in the direction of this pro-Israel orientation becoming stronger. 9/11 greatly enhanced the perception of Israel as a vital ally, while the demographic and political importance of Israel's strongest supporters, evangelicals and Orthodox Jews has been growing. In contrast, the mainline church, the largest base of vociferous opposition to Israel, is declining in size and political significance. In parallel, the membership of AIPAC has increased, while the number of people attending AIPAC's annual policy conference has risen from about 500 in the early 1970s to 13,000 in 2013, including around half of the members of the Congress.
Yet there are several potential challenges to underlying sympathy for Israel. This raises the key political issue at the heart of the Israel paradox, namely whether higher levels of sympathy necessarily translate into higher levels of political support. Regarding Israeli security, the answer is yes. In the wake of 9/11, the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the growing threat of a nuclear Iran, Israel has come to be viewed as one of America's closest allies.
From this perspective, a victory for Israel against these enemies is a victory for the US and a defeat for Israel would be a defeat for the US. This fusing of American and Israeli security in the public mind means that for the American public, Presidential support for Israeli security serves as a kind of litmus test of Presidential credibility on American security itself 96 .
However, the overwhelming bulk of this growth in support for Israel is on the Right side of the political spectrum. This means that a Republican administration is more likely to lean towards To sum up, identification with Israel remains deeply embedded in American political culture.
Widespread sympathy for Israel and the bipartisan norm of a U.S. commitment to Israeli security remain strong. However, different interpretations of how to practically implement that norm as regards the peace process are coalescing along partisan and ideological lines. This has important political ramifications for Israel, because when the Democrats are in power, the Israeli government is likely to face an administration more inclined to be 'even-handed' and a pro-Israel community that it more divided and thus less potent when it comes to opposing pressure on Israel on the divisive issue of settlements. This has already been apparent during the Obama administration. It is an illusion for an Israeli government to think that, over time; it can retain bipartisan support in the US and at the same time keep the settlers happy.
